

The Probabilistic Logic of Communication and Change

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Urn example and Informational cascades

Example

- A room has either one of two urns:
 - Majority **White**: $\{W, W, B\}$
 - Majority **Black**: $\{B, B, W\}$.
- People line up to enter the room one-by-one to:
 - **Draw** a ball (observe and replace)
 - **Write** down a guess (for all to see) as to which **urn** it is
- In forming a guess, agents take into account:
 - The **outcome** (ball) of their draw
 - The **guesses** (which urn) that came before
- A **Cascade** develops if agents' conclusions are dominated by guesses that came before
 - **False cascade**: a cascade where agents' conclusions do not match the real situation
 - **Correct cascade**: a cascade where agents' conclusions do match the real situation

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We want a logic (to reason about cascades and related examples) with

- **Probabilistic** components (which urn is more likely)
- **Epistemic** components (beliefs agents have about each other)
- **Common knowledge** (of the rules of the example)
- **Dynamic updates** (to model how agents' views change)

Probabilistic Logic of Communication and Change

We propose the **Probabilistic Logic of Communication and Change**, the synthesis of variants of the following logics:

- **Logic of Communication and Change**

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This is a **dynamic epistemic-PDL** without knowledge axioms. We enforce knowledge axioms. Epistemic-PDL can express **common knowledge**.

- **Dynamic Epistemic Probabilistic Logic**

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PLCC

Language of the Probabilistic Logic of Communication and Change:

$\phi ::= \text{true} \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi' \mid [\pi]\phi \mid [e]\phi \mid t_a \geq \beta$ (formulas)

$t_a ::= \alpha \cdot P_a(\phi) \mid t_a + t'_a$ (probability terms)

$\pi ::= a \mid \pi; \pi' \mid \pi \cup \pi' \mid \pi^* \mid ?\phi$ (epistemic programs)

$p \in At$ (atomic proposition) such as the urn has majority white

$a \in Ag$ (agent)

$\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Q}$ (rational numbers)

$e \in E$ (epistemic update event) such as drawing from urn

Examples

- $.6 \cdot P_a(p) + .2 \cdot P_a([b]p) \geq .5$
- $[(a \cup b)^*]p$ It is common knowledge among a and b that p .
- $[e][a]p$ After informational event e , a would believe p .

PE-PDL

Language of Probabilistic Epistemic Propositional Dynamic Logic:
Same as PLCC, but with dynamic formulas $[e]\varphi$ removed.

Definition (Bayesian Kripke models)

$M = (S, \sim, \mu, V)$ where:

- S - (non-empty) set of **states**
- \sim - **equivalence relations** \sim_a on S , for each agent a
- μ - **indexed probability functions** $\mu_a : S \rightarrow (S \rightarrow [0, 1])$, with values denoted $\mu_a^s(s')$, and satisfying:
 - **State-determined probability (SDP)**
each agent knows her probability
if $s \sim_a t$, then $\mu_a^s(s') = \mu_a^t(s')$ for all $s' \in S$
 - **Consistency (CONS)**
consistency of probabilities with knowledge
 $\mu_a^s(t) = 0$ if $s \not\sim_a t$
 - **Caution (CAUT)** agents are cautious
 $s \not\sim_a t$ if $\mu_a^s(t) = 0$
 - **Probability (PROB)** μ_a^s is a probability mass function.
 $\sum_{t \in S} \mu_a^s(t) = 1$
- $V : At \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(S)$ a **valuation function**.

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Select semantics of PE-PDL

$$\begin{array}{ll} M, s \models p & \text{iff } s \in V(p) \\ M, s \models [\pi]\phi & \text{iff } M, t \models \phi \text{ whenever } sR_\pi t \\ M, s \models \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j P_a(\phi_j) \geq \beta & \text{iff } \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j \cdot \mu_a^s(\phi_j) \geq \beta \end{array}$$

where $\mu_a^s(\phi_j)$ abbreviates $\sum_{s' \in S, s' \models \phi_j} \mu_a^s(s')$,

and R_π is a binary relation given by

$$\begin{array}{ll} sR_a t & \text{iff } s \sim_a t \\ sR_{\pi_1 \cup \pi_2} t & \text{iff } s(R_{\pi_1} \cup R_{\pi_2})t \\ sR_{\pi_1; \pi_2} t & \text{iff } sR_{\pi_1}; R_{\pi_2} t \text{ (there is } w, \text{ such that } sR_{\pi_1} w \text{ and } wR_{\pi_2} t) \\ sR_{\pi^*} t & \text{iff } s(R_\pi)^* t \text{ ((} R_\pi \text{)}^* \text{ the reflexive transitive closure of } R_\pi) \\ sR_? \phi t & \text{iff } s = t \text{ and } M, s \models \phi \end{array}$$

Example (Relativized common knowledge)

Let

$$C_{\{a,b\}}(\psi, \phi) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [(\ ?\psi; (a \cup b))^*]\phi$$

“ ϕ is common knowledge among a and b conditional on ψ ”.

$M, s \models C_{\{a,b\}}(\psi, \phi)$ if and only if every path involving \sim_a and \sim_b from s that consists exclusively of states that make ψ true ends in a state that makes ϕ true.

Theorem

There is a sound and weakly complete proof system for PE-PDL with respect to Bayesian Kripke models.

- The proof system combines axioms for
 - agent programs (from propositional dynamic logic),
 - knowledge (for equivalence relations),
 - probabilities (and mix with atomic agent programs)
 - linear inequalities
- The completeness proof adapts the proof of PDL to one where atomic actions/agents are equivalence relations.

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$$[\pi](\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ([\pi]\phi \rightarrow [\pi]\psi)$$

$$[\pi_1; \pi_2]\phi \leftrightarrow [\pi_1][\pi_2]\phi$$

$$[\pi_1 \cup \pi_2]\phi \leftrightarrow [\pi_1]\phi \wedge [\pi_2]\phi$$

$$[\pi^*]\phi \leftrightarrow (\phi \wedge [\pi][\pi^*]\phi)$$

$$[\pi^*](\phi \rightarrow [\pi]\phi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow [\pi^*]\phi)$$

$$[\phi?]\psi \leftrightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \psi)$$

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$$[a]\phi \rightarrow \phi$$

$$[a]\phi \rightarrow [a][a]\phi$$

$$\neg[a]\phi \rightarrow [a]\neg[a]\phi$$

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$$P_a(\phi) \geq 0$$

$$P_a(\text{true}) = 1$$

$$P(\phi \wedge \psi) + P(\phi \wedge \neg\psi) = P_a(\phi)$$

$$P_a(\phi) = P_a(\psi) \text{ if } \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \text{ is a propositional tautology.}$$

$$[a]\phi \leftrightarrow P_a(\phi) \geq 1$$

$$w \rightarrow [a]w, \text{ for any } w \text{ an } a\text{-probability formulas.}$$

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$$t \geq \beta \leftrightarrow t + 0P_a(\phi) \geq \beta$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k P_a(\phi_k) \geq \beta \rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_{j_k} P_a(\phi_{j_k}) \geq \beta$$

(for any permutation j_1, \dots, j_n of $1, \dots, n$)

$$\sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k P_a(\phi_k) \geq \beta \wedge \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha'_k P_a(\phi_k) \geq \beta'$$
$$\rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^n (\alpha_k + \alpha'_k) P_a(\phi_k) \geq (\beta + \beta')$$

$$t \geq \beta \leftrightarrow dt \geq d\beta \text{ if } d > 0$$

$$t \geq \beta \vee t \leq \beta$$

$$t \geq \beta \rightarrow t \geq \gamma \text{ if } \beta > \gamma$$

- The completeness proof adapts the proof of PDL to one where atomic actions/agents are equivalence relations.

Definition (Event Models)

$A = (E, \sim, \Phi, \text{pre}, \text{sub})$ where:

- E - the (finite non-empty) set of **epistemic update events**.
- \sim - **equivalence relations** \sim_a on E for each agent a .
- Φ - finite pairwise inconsistent set of **precondition** formulas
- pre - functions $\text{pre}_a : \Phi \rightarrow (E \rightarrow [0, 1])$ for each $a \in \text{Ag}$,
 $\text{pre}_a(\phi)$ is a **subjective occurrence probability** function
($\sum_{e \in E} \text{pre}_a(\phi)(e) = 1$)

$$\text{PRE} : E \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Phi)$$

$$\text{PRE} : e \mapsto \{\phi \mid \text{pre}(\phi)(e) > 0\}$$

$$\text{pre}_a(e \mid s) = \begin{cases} \text{pre}_a(\phi)(e) & \phi \in \Phi, M, s \models \phi \\ 0 & \text{there is no such } \phi \end{cases}$$

- sub - a **substitution function** $\text{sub}(e) : \text{At} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{PLCC}}$ for each $e \in E$ (mapping all but finitely many $p \in \text{At}$ to themselves).

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Definition (Product Update)

$M = (S, \sim, \mu, V)$ Bayesian Kripke model

$A = (E, \sim, \Phi, \text{pre}, \text{sub})$ event model

$M \otimes A = (S \otimes E, \sim, \mu, V)$ update product

- $S \otimes E \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(s, e) \mid s \in S, e \in E, (M, s) \models \bigvee \text{PRE}(e)\}$.
- $(s, e) \sim_a (s', e')$ iff $s \sim_a s'$ and $e \sim_a e'$.
- Let $D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{(s', e') \sim_a (w, g)} (\mu_a^w(s') \cdot \text{pre}_a(e' \mid s'))$, and put:

$$\mu_a^{(w, g)}(s, e) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \frac{\mu_a^w(s) \cdot \text{pre}_a(e \mid s)}{D} & \text{if } (s, e) \sim_a (w, g) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

(Note that $D \neq 0$ for $(w, g) \in S \otimes E$.)

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- $(s, e) \sim_a (s', e')$ iff $s \sim_a s'$ and $e \sim_a e'$.
- Let $D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{(s', e') \sim_a (w, g)} (\mu_a^w(s') \cdot \text{pre}_a(e' \mid s'))$, and put:

$$\mu_a^{(w, g)}(s, e) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \frac{\mu_a^w(s) \cdot \text{pre}_a(e \mid s)}{D} & \text{if } (s, e) \sim_a (w, g) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

(Note that $D \neq 0$ for $(w, g) \in S \otimes E$.)

- $V(p) = \{(s, e) \mid M, s \models \text{sub}(e)(p)\}$

The semantics of PLCC is the same as for PE-PDL, but with the following extra clause:

$$M, s \models [e]\phi \quad \text{iff} \quad M, s \models \bigvee \text{PRE}(e) \text{ then } M \times A, (s, e) \models \phi,$$

where e is an event in action model A

Urn example with formulas

Basic elements of the language

- $Ag \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{1, \dots, n\}$ (agents)
- $At \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{MW, MB\} \cup \{DW_i, DB_i, W_i, B_i\}_{i \in Ag}$ (atoms)
- $E \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{dw_i, db_i, w_i, b_i\}_{i \in Ag}$ (events)

Some useful formulas and sets:

$$\chi_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (MW \vee MB) \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (DW_j \vee DB_j) \\ \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (W_j \vee B_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{p \in At_{\geq i}} \neg p$$

The situation right before i draws


$$\chi_i^D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (MW \vee MB) \wedge \bigwedge_{j \leq i} (DW_j \vee DB_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (W_j \vee B_j) \\ \wedge \neg (W_i \vee B_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{p \in At_{> i}} \neg p$$

The situation right before i writes

$$At_{\geq i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{DW_j, DB_j, W_j, B_j\}_{i \leq j \leq n}$$

$$At_{> i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{DW_j, DB_j, W_j, B_j\}_{i < j \leq n}$$

Depiction of Event Model: updates of probabilities



$$\psi_i^W \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} MW \wedge \chi_i$$

The urn has majority white and it is right before agent i draws a ball.

$$\psi_i^B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} MB \wedge \chi_i$$

$$\phi_i^W \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} P_i(MW) > P_i(MB) \vee (DW_i \wedge P_i(MW) = P_i(MB)) \wedge \chi_i^D$$

i either considers the majority white urn more likely or i considers them equally likely but had just drawn white.

$$\phi_i^B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} P_i(MB) > P_i(MW) \vee (DB_i \wedge P_i(MW) = P_i(MB)) \wedge \chi_i^D$$

Depiction of Event Model: updates of atoms

$$\text{sub}(dw_i, p) = \begin{cases} \chi_i & p = DW_i \\ p & p \neq DW_i \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{dw}_i \leftarrow j \neq i \rightarrow \text{db}_i \end{array} \quad \text{sub}(db_i, p) = \begin{cases} \chi_i & p = DB_i \\ p & p \neq DB_i \end{cases}$$

$$\text{sub}(w_i, p) = \begin{cases} \chi_i^D & p = W_i \\ p & p \neq W_i \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{w}_i \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{b}_i \end{array} \quad \text{sub}(b_i, p) = \begin{cases} \chi_i^D & p = B_i \\ p & p \neq B_i \end{cases}$$

$$\chi_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{MW} \vee \text{MB}) \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (\text{DW}_j \vee \text{DB}_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (\text{W}_j \vee \text{B}_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{p \in \text{At}_{\geq i}} \neg p$$

The situation right before i draws

$$\chi_i^D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{MW} \vee \text{MB}) \wedge \bigwedge_{j \leq i} (\text{DW}_j \vee \text{DB}_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{j < i} (\text{W}_j \vee \text{B}_j) \wedge \neg (\text{W}_i \vee \text{B}_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{p \in \text{At}_{> i}} \neg p$$

The situation right before i writes

$$\text{At}_{\geq i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\text{DW}_j, \text{DB}_j, \text{W}_j, \text{B}_j\}_{i \leq j \leq n}$$

$$\text{At}_{> i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\text{DW}_j, \text{DB}_j, \text{W}_j, \text{B}_j\}_{i < j \leq n}$$

$$\chi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{MW} \vee \text{MB}) \wedge \neg(\text{MW} \wedge \text{MB}) \wedge$$

Exactly one urn is placed in the room

$$\bigwedge_{i \in \text{Ag}} (P_i(\text{MW}) = P_i(\text{MB})) \wedge$$

Each agent considers each urn equally likely

$$\bigwedge_{p \in \text{At}_{\geq 1}} \neg p$$

Noone has drawn or written anything

Proposition

For all $1 \leq j \leq i$, let $f_j \in \{\text{dw}_j, \text{db}_j\}$ and $g_j \in \{\text{w}_j, \text{b}_j\}$. Then

$$[(\bigcup_{i \in \text{Ag}} i)^*] \chi \Rightarrow$$
$$[\text{dw}_1][g_1][\text{dw}_2][g_2][f_3][g_3] \dots [f_i][g_i] (P_k(\text{MW}) > P_k(\text{MB}))$$

If it is common knowledge of χ , and the first two balls to be drawn are white, then after subsequent draws, every agent will consider the majority white urn to be more likely.

$$\chi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{MW} \vee \text{MB}) \wedge \neg(\text{MW} \wedge \text{MB}) \wedge$$

Exactly one urn is placed in the room

$$\bigwedge_{i \in \text{Ag}} (P_i(\text{MW}) = P_i(\text{MB})) \wedge$$

Each agent considers each urn equally likely

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
$$[(\bigcup_{i \in \text{Ag}} i)^*] \chi \Rightarrow$$
$$[\text{dw}_1][g_1][\text{dw}_2][g_2][f_3][g_3] \dots [f_i][g_i] (P_k(\text{MW}) > P_k(\text{MB}))$$

If it is common knowledge of χ , and the first two balls to be drawn are white, then after subsequent draws, every agent will consider the majority white urn to be more likely.

Let

- MW be a state whose only atom is MW and
- MB be a state whose only atom is MB

Any model satisfying $[(\bigcup_{i \in Ag} i)^*]\chi$ and MB is bisimilar to:



Recall

$$\chi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (MW \vee MB) \wedge \neg(MW \wedge MB) \wedge$$

Exactly one urn is placed in the room


$$\bigwedge_{i \in Ag} (P_i(MW) = P_i(MB)) \wedge$$

Each agent considers each urn equally likely

$$\bigwedge_{p \in At_{\geq 1}} \neg p$$


Noone has drawn or written anything

After agent 1 draws white



Agent 1 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.


After agent 1 draws white




Agent 1 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.

Agent 1 has just written her guess

The result of agent 1's guess is **bisimilar** (via generated submodel) to the following:




After second agent draws white



Agent 2 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.


After second agent draws white




Agent 2 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.

After agent 2 writes

The result of agent 2's guess is **bisimilar** (via generated submodel) to the following:




Result of agent 3 drawing black




Agent 3 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.

Result of agent 3 drawing black



Agent 3 considers the majority white urn to be more likely, and will write white.

Result of agent 3 writing




$\models P_k(\text{MW}) = 12/15 \wedge P_k(\text{MB}) = 3/15.$

($\models P_k(\text{MW}) = 4/5 \wedge P_k(\text{MB}) = 1/5.$)

This is similar to the situation after agent 2 wrote.

Result of agent 3 writing



$\models P_k(\text{MW}) = 12/15 \wedge P_k(\text{MB}) = 3/15.$

($\models P_k(\text{MW}) = 4/5 \wedge P_k(\text{MB}) = 1/5.$)

This is similar to the situation after agent 2 wrote.

- $[e]p \leftrightarrow (\text{pre}(e) \rightarrow \text{sub}(e)(p))$
- $[e]\neg\phi \leftrightarrow (\text{pre}(e) \rightarrow \neg[e]\phi)$
- $[e](\phi \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow ([e]\phi \wedge [e]\psi)$
- $[e][\pi]\phi \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{f \in E} [T_{ef}\pi][f]\phi$

T_{ef} is a **program transformer** whose definition depends on **test programs** $[?\phi]$.

- $[e](\sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k \cdot P_a(\psi_k) \geq \beta) \leftrightarrow (\text{pre}(e) \rightarrow C \geq D)$, where
$$C = \sum_{\phi \in \Phi} \sum_{f \sim_a e} \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_k \cdot \text{pre}_a(f \mid \phi) \cdot P_a(\phi \wedge [f]\psi_k),$$
$$D = \sum_{\phi \in \Phi} \sum_{f \sim_a e} \beta \cdot \text{pre}_a(f \mid \phi) \cdot P_a(\phi).$$

Theorem (Weak completeness)

For all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{PLCC}$,

$\vdash \varphi$ if and only if $\models \varphi$

- **Proof by reduction** Proof reduces each PLCC formula to a provably equivalent PE-PDL formula. Completeness then follows from completeness of PE-PDL
- **Decidability** follows from computability of the reduction and finite model construction in the completeness proof of PE-PDL
- Although PLCC and PE-PDL are **equi-expressive**, PLCC formulas are often more **succinct** than PE-PDL formulas.

- We provided a dynamic probabilistic (epistemic) logic that can express common knowledge:
- We expect that this language will be used for other examples:
 - Variations of the Urn Example
 - Other examples of informational cascade
 - Other multi-agent probabilistic examples
- Language can be adapted further to incorporate preferences or payoffs

A Key Observation

Higher order reasoning (even common knowledge) cannot necessarily prevent false cascades.

THANK YOU!